The Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt by George H. Hempel
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt





Chapter Title: Identification of Characteristics Denoting Quality
Chapter Author: George H. Hempel
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3428
Chapter pages in book: (p. 33 - 47)4
IDENTIFICATIONOF
CHARACTERISTICS DENOTING QUALITY
In this chapter the historical record of instrument and borrower characteris-
tics as indicators of state and local debt difficulties is examined. The borrow-
er and instrument characteristics that were indicators of past payment prob-
lems are examined in two ways: first, identifying the aggregate characteristics
that seem to have led to the heavy incidence of defaults and losses in each of
the four major default periods; second, classifying the historically significant
characteristics according to the primary groupings of variables for the concep-
tual model developed in Chater 2. Cross sections of available instrument and
borrower characteristics for defaulting and nondefaulting issues are analyzed.
Characteristics Corresponding with Past Payment Difficulties
The first major default and loss period was in 1839-43. Some of the primary
characteristics leading to the heavy incidence of defaults and losses are appar-
ent, despite the scarcity of data. Table 6 shows that net state and local debt
increased from $13 million in 1825 to $51 million in 1835, $196 million in
1840 and $260 million in 1843. Table 6 also shows that between 85 and 90
per cent of this indebtedness was incurred by states, most of this debt for
purposes of indicating questionable financial prudence. Census data reveals
that 95 per cent of the state indebtedness outstanding in 1838 was for private
or state enterprises such as banking, canals, railroads andturnpikes.1
It is doubtful that any measure of wealth or income indicating potential
cash inflows increased as rapidly as the state and local debt service charges
that resulted from the increased indebtedness. A large proportion of state
'The Tenth Census, VII, p.526showed gross state indebtedness of $54 million for
banking, $60 million for canals, $43 million for railroads, $7 million for turnpikes and
$8 million for other purposes.34 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
TABLE 6
Estimated Net State and Local Debt Outstanding in Selected
Periods, 1825-1902
(in millions of dollars)
Net State and Local Debta
NetStateDebt NetLocalDebt Year Total PerCapita
1825 13 1 13b .
1835 51 3 46b 5c
1840 196 12 176d 20e
1843 260 14 232f 28b
1850 230 10 190e 40c
1860 457 15 257g 200e
















aNet state and local debt computed by adding net state debt and net local debt.Per
capita debt computed using Bureau of the Census population figures.
bRE Badger and H.G. Guthmann, Investment Principles and Practices, New York,
195 1, pp. 555-558.
from indebtedness of large cities described in Uillhouse, Municipal Bonds,
pp. 3 1-34; William L. Raymond, State and Municipal Bonds, Boston, 1932, pp. 295-298;
and ftC. Adams, Public Debts, New York, 1890, 34 1-344.
dEstimatedfrom Census figures of $164 million in 1839 and $190 million in 1841 in
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census of the United States:1880.Valuation,
Taxation, and Public Indebtedness, VII, p. 281.
CPauI Strudenski, Public Borrowing, National Municipal League, New York, 1930,
pp. 5-13.
Magazine and Democratic Review, XII, (February 1843), pp. 211-212. These
figures are probably gross debt; however, debt offsets were probably small at that time.
gus Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census, VII,pp. 281-285.
hus Department of Commerce, Wealth, Debt, andTaxation, 1913, I, pp. 38, 234-235.
n =negligibleor amount probably less than $.5 million.Identification of Quality Characteristics 35
revenues in the 1830's probably came from debt-financed private or state
enterprises. The severe depression following the Panic of 1837 led to a large
decline in the wealth and income of most state and local units. Many of the
revenue-producing enterprises either failed completely or ran at a loss. Addi-
tional debt financing temporarily kept some states from defaulting but also
increased the amount of service charges, which had to be paid from declining
cash inflows. As the incidence of defaults increased, this temporary sOurce of
cash was cut off. States committed nine of the twelve defaults and accounted
for the entire amount of permanent losses in this period.2
Unwillingness to pay was also an important factor in this default period.
Once debt-financed private or state banks, canals, railroads and turnpikes
proved unsuccessful, state officials and residents seem to have felt that the
bondholders rather than the borrowers should bear the brunt of the loss.
Many of the instrument and borrower characteristics that led to the first
major default and loss period recurred as casual factors in the second major
default and loss period, 1873-79. After declining from the early 1840's to the
early 1850's, state and local debt began to rise rapidly. Table 6 shows that
aggregate net state and local debt nearly doubled from 1850 to 1860 and
from 1860 to 1870. The indebtedness of units in the South (excluding the
debts of Confederate states which were declared invalid at the end of the Civil
War) grew more rapidly than total state and local indebtedness. The majority
of Southern borrowing was spent on waterworks, railroad facilities, Civil War
expenditures and reconstruction
Therapidly rising cost of servicing the increased indebtedness did not
appear to be matched by a commensurate increase in wealth or income mea-
sures indicating potential cash inflows. The estimated true value of real and
personal property declined approximately 18 per cent in the Southern states
from 1860 to A serious downturn starting in 1873 reduced wealth
and income in all sections of the country. As the depression dragged on, a
rising number of poorly conceived railroad ventures failed or became finan-
cially dependent. The combination of heavy fixed costs, sometimes contract-
ed for questionable purposes, and declining cash inflows proved too great a
burden in many cases.
Financial prudence and willingness to pay was questionable in many of the
resulting defaults and losses. Public funds were frequently used for private
interests financing railroads. The optimistic predictions regarding the earning
2More detail and supporting evidence for the defaults in this period appears in Ratch-
ford,American State Debts, pp. 1-16 1.
3Tenth Census, VII, pp. 283-293.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DIdentification of Quality Characteristics 37
power of the sponsored projects often failed to materialize, leaving the gov-
ernmental unit and its taxpayers saddled with a heavy debt. Table 7 shows
that approximately two-thirds of the defaults in this period were on debts
issued to finance railroad facilities. The largest dollar amount in default and
the majority of the permanent losses were by Southern state and local units.
After the Civil War, many of the Southern governmental units were overrun
by dishonest politicians who engaged in speculative activities and sometimes
carried away the proceeds of debts incurred in the name of the governing
body. In addition, some short-sighted Southern governmental units took ad-
vantage of the politically opportunity to repudiate debts which had
been used in their interest?
After declining slightly in the late 1870's aggregate state and local debt
grew rapidly through the mid-i 890's. Table 6 shows that all of this growth
was due to increased local indebtedness. The outstanding indebtedness of
states declined in this period. By 1890, net state debt was slightly less than 20
per cent of net state and local debt, lower than net state debt had been in the
1840's. Real estate booms in the central and western sectors of the United
States were a major cause in the growth of local indebtedness. General im-
provements, railroads, roads, bridges, water facilities, etc., in these fast grow-
ing areas were financed by local issues.6
Defaults and losses on state and local debts became a serious economic
problem again after the panic and depression of 1893 lowered wealth and
income, sources of potential cash inflows. None of the defaults in this period
were by state governments. Aggregate state debt service charges had fallen
since the mid-i 870's.7 Many of the local defaults were caused by the collapse
of speculative real estate booms, which had been aided by local borrowing.
When the planned increases in local cash inflows failed to materialize, many
units were unable to pay their high debt service costs. Table 4 shows that the
number of defaults was highest in the central and western regions of the
United States. The primary purposes for which the defaulting local debts had
been issued were railroads, general improvements and funding and refunding,
as Table 7 shows.
Once again, unwillingness to pay and the lack of financial prudence contri-
buted to local defaults and losses. Private interests, such as real estate specula-
tors and railroads, had encouraged borrowing beyond the unit's existing ca-
pacity to pay. Many officials and taxpayers in the local units were willing to
borrow to encourage growth, but unwilling to pay the subsequently increased
taxes when this growth failed to materialize.
5Thc causes of and amounts involved inmany of these Southern default situations
are described in Ratchford, American State Debts, pp. 162-229 and Hilihouse, Municipal
Bonds, pp. 39-61.
6Hilhouse, Municipal Bonds,pp. 39-44.
7Ratchford,American State Debts,pp. 253-258.38 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
There is more information about the aggregate characteristics leading to
the fourth, and most recent, major default and loss period. State and local
debt grew rapidly in the early 1900's. State and local debt outstanding grew
from $4.4 billion in 1913 to $19 billion in 1931. The growth in this form of
debt became particularly rapid after the end of World War I through 1931
when debt limits were hurdled, new overlapping governmental units were
created, old state and local services were expanded and many new ones were
added. The yearly amount of long-term state and local debt issued had never
exceeded $500 million before 1919. In every year from 1921 through 1931
the yearly amount exceeded $1.1 billion and the annual average for that
period was nearly $1 .4 billion.8
State and local cash inflows did not increase nearly as rapidly as did the
debt service charges. Wealth and income, grew at a slower pace than state and
local debt. From 1919 through 1928 the coverage of net state and local debt
by net wealth fell from 71.1 times to 35.0 times and the ratio of net state and
local debt to national income increased from .076 to
The depression starting in 1929 severely lowered both wealth and income.
In 1932 the coverage of net state and local debt by net Wealth had fallen to
19.5 times and the ratio of net state and local debt to national income
increased to .388. Figures for the coverage of interest and estimated debt
service charges by state and local revenues are available for 1922 and 1932.
Interest payments were 8.3 per cent and estimated debt service charges were
12.7 per cent of state and local revenues in 1922. In 1932 interest payments
had risen to 10.7 per cent and estimated debt service charges to 19.7 per cent
of state and local revenues.10
It is possible to investigate other aspects of the cash inflows available to
meet the rapidly rising debt service charges during this period. Total state and
local revenues remained at approximately the same level from 1927 through
1934, but the sources of these revenues shifted considerably. Cash revenues
from property taxes declined approximately $700 million, from 60 per cent
to 48 per cent of total revenues during the period, primarily because assessed
8See Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for yearly figures.
9See Appendix Table 4 for yearly figures.
10U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics on State and Local Government
Finances, 1902-1953, Special Studies Number 38, 1955, pp. 17-18. Principal due was
estimated by taking the difference between long-term debt issued and net change in
long-term debt for the year. This figure is conservative because some debt was issued to
replace outstanding debt.
"Chart 16 (p. 74 ) shows that the proportion of property taxes that were uncol-
lected in cities with over 50 thousand residents rose from 4.7 per cent in 1928 to 26.3
per cent in 1933.Identification of Quality Characteristics 39
property values declined and the proportion of property taxes that were not
collected rose.1
1On the other hand, state and local revenues from the federal
government increased approximately $900 million, from 1 per cent of the
total state and local revenues in 1927 to 12 per cent in 1934. Despite em-
ployee cutbacks, payless paydays and large reductions in capital outlays, state
and local cash outflows excluding debt service charges proved very difficult to
cut. Current operating expenditures were higher in the early 1930's than they
were in 1927, and assistance and subsidies increased from $93 million in 1927
to $815 million in1934.12
At first the effects of high debt service costs, unexpanding revenues and
rising expenditure requirements were overcome by skipping sinking fund pay-
ments, by reducing liquid assets and by additional borrowing. Short-term
debt secured by anticipated or uncollected property taxes was a popular
source of cash, but added to the burgeoning debt service costs. When the
financial pressures persisted13 and the temporary sources of cash dried up
because of bank failures, high interest costs and loss of public confidence in
state and local debts, many governmental units were forced to default. The
number of defaults in this period would have been much greater if many state
and local units had not forced funding and refunding issues on bondholders
and had not used the proceeds from federally aided relief debt issues to meet
debt service payments.
Financial prudence and willingness to pay would be questioned in some of
the default situations in the 1929-37 period. Some state and local units were
forced to default because of the lack of financial planning and the generally
poor quality of many governmental administrations. Special assessment or
local improvement districts were created to permit the improvement of un-
developed and speculative areas. Some debts which were issued depended
entirely on the future growth of wealth and income i.n the area. In some
cases, the officers of real estate companies became officials of local units and
promoted bond. issues to develop their companies' properties. Finally, a few
small communities appear to have decided that bondholders should bear part
of their costs. Nevertheless, the incidence of excessive financial mismanage-
ment or widespread unwillingness to pay in this default period was relatively
less than the incidence in any of the previous major default periods. This
contention is supported by the relatively rapid and complete recovery in most
of the larger default situations and the small amount of permanent losses
'2State and local revenues and expenditures for selected years from 1922 through
1968 appear in Tables 10 (p. 56) and 11 (p.63), respectively.
t3For example, Census data indicates that in 1932 total state and localrevenues were
$7,887 million, state and local expenditures (excluding all debt service charges) $7,563
million, interest expenses $840 million and estimated long-term principal payments due
probably was approximately $1,400 million.40 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
relative to the amount of debt in default.
The analysis of the time distribution of defaults in the preceding.chapter
indicated that defaults occurred almost continuously. Several instrument and
borrower characteristics recurred frequently as indicators of the default situa-
tions in times other than the major default and loss periods.14 First, some
defaulting governmental units contracted for debt service charges that were
clearly above the minimum cash flows they could reasonably anticipate. Séc-
ond, some defaulting units suffered severe declines in cash revenues due to
natural catastrophes or economic declines in the area or industry on which
the unit was dependent. It would have been difficult to have predicted some
of these declines; however, many of the units which were forced to default
had allowed themselves very little margin for such contingencies. Third, Table
8 (p.44) demonstrates that many of the bonds which defaulted in times other
than the major default periods were issued to finance railroad facilities and
other private ventures. If these enterprises failed, many state and local units
were either unable or unwilling to pay the debt service charges contracted in
financing the enterprises. Finally, poor financial planning and dishonest or
inept officials led to some default situations.
Aggregate Historical Characteristics Conforming
with the Conceptual Model
The instrument and borrower characteristics that were significant in the past
seem to conform closely with the conceptual model formulated in Chapter 2.
The defaults on state and local debts were caused by the issuing unit having
inadequate cash flows available to meet debt service charges or by unwilling-
ness to pay on the part of the issuing unit. In the past, defaults and losses on
state and local debt became a serious problem only when economic declines
lowered wealth and income to the point that it significantly affected cash
inflows. Prior to each of the major default periods., however, certain instru-
ment and borrower characteristics indicated that state and local units were
vulnerable to economic declines. Most of these same characteristics were also
indicators of defaults in periods other than depressions. The objective of the
following paragraphs is to identify the aggregate characteristics that indicated
vulnerability in the past.
The debt service charges which must be paid are the first variable in the
conceptual model. A rapid increase in the amount of debt outstanding, a
surrogate for debt service charges, occurred before each of the four major
"The characteristics for individual issues rather than aggregate characteristics had to
be considered for the default situations in times other than the major default and loss
periods.Identification of Quality Characteristics 41
default periods and prior to many individual default situations. Debt service
charge figures are often available for individual units; however, there are no
aggregate debt service charge figures available at the present time. The
amount of debt outstanding should be adjusted for changes in interest costs
and in the retirement schedule or sinking fund requirements when such fig-
ures are available.
The expected over-all cash inflows during the period of the indebtedness
are the second variable. Current state and local revenues by themselves are an
inadequate measure. Expected over-all cash inflows also depend on wealth
and income levels, acceptable rates of taxation or payment for services, and
potential short-term sources of cash. Wealth and income measures, which are
indicative of potential cash inflows, seem to have risen less rapidly than
estimated debt service charges before each of the four major default periods.
These measures then declined absolutely in the economic decline immediately
preceding the heavy incidence of defaults. The aggregate wealth and income
measures observed included population, total net wealth, assessed property
value, estimated full property value, national income and disposable personal
income.
There is no quantitative information about the amount of taxes or pay-
ments for services that people are willing to pay. However, state and local
units were generally unable to raise tax rates in periods when income and
wealth were declining. Temporary sources of cash inflows appear to have
been used to prevent defaults immediately prior to the major default periods.
In each major default period, state and local indebtedness increased very
rapidly in the two or three years between the start of an economic decline
and the period when the incidence of defaults and losses became heavy. State
and local units reduced their cash and security holding slightly over 15 per
cent from 1929 to 1933. The majority of the remaining assets were state and
local securities.15 Figures for state and local cash and security holdings are
not available for the other major default periods.
The relationships between debt service charges and the wealth measures
indicating potential cash inflows give only a partial picture of prospective
quality. The expected cash expenditures or outflows that have priority over
debt service charges, the third variable in the conceptual model, must also be
considered. Whether or not a governmental unit is able to meet its debt
service charges is determined by the minimum difference between cash in-
flows and cash outflows that are paid before debt service charges. In the past
this minimum difference has always occurred when cash revenues had declin-
ed. For this reason, the level of expenditures as cash revenues decline is
15Raymond W. Goldsmith, Robert E. Lipsey and Morris Mendelson, Studies in the
National Balance Sheet of the United States, Vol. II, Princeton for NBER, 1963, Table
III-6a, pp. 218-2 19.42 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
emphasized. In the past, some expenditures requiring cash outlays have risen,
some have stayed relatively constant, and some declined when cash inflows
have declined.
Aggregate state and local expenditures were classified by character and
function for several years prior to and during the 1929 default period. De-
spite austerity programs by many individual units, state and local units were
unable to reduce aggregate current outlays in this period. The expenditures
for current outlays were slightly higher in 1932 and 1934 than they had been
in 1927. By 1934 state and local capital outlays had declined approximately
40 per cent from their 1927 level. The entire decline was absorbed by the
increase in expenditures for assistance and subsidies. Classified according to
function, expenditures for education, highways, sanitation and recreation fell
significantly from 1927 to 1934. But expenditures for such functions as
hospitals, health, police and fire protection and general control remained
about the same; and those for public welfare and natural resources increased
significantly from 1927 to 1934.16
The borrower's financial prudence and willingness to pay is the fourth
variable in the conceptual model. The influence is strictly negative, as finan-
cial prudence and willingness to pay cannot create additional wealth or in-
come for the borrower. Financial prudence and willingness to pay are often
assumed for all state and local governmental units; however, inadequacies in
these basic traits have recurred as causal factors in all four of the major
default periods. Unwillingness to pay has led to the majority of the perma-
nent losses in these periods. These characteristics also show up as a major
cause of defaults in less extreme periods.
Poor financial planning and management, a lack of financial prudence,
existed in many state and local units prior to the actual default as well as in
many nondefaulting units. However, many of the units which defaulted
would not have done so had they adequate financial planning and manage-
ment. Very few instrument and borrower characteristics are available to mea-
sure the financial prudence of the borrower. Two characteristics were particu-
larly good indicators of the lack of financial prudence in the past —theuse of
state and local debt for essentially private purposes and a continuing deficit in
the current account of the governmental unit. Other pertinent characteristics,
such as the ability of government officials and the use of budgeting tech-
niques, are very difficult to assess.
Historically, the state and local units which had exercised financial pru-
dence were also usually willing to pay their debt service charges if this was
'6lnformation on state and local expenditures were taken from reports by the Gov-
ernments Division of the Bureau of the Census. Tables 11 and l2(pp. 63 and 64,
respectively) show the proportionate amount of state and local expenditures by charac-
ter and by purpose in selected years from 1922 through 1968.Identification of Quality Characteristics 43
possible. Once state and local officials had resorted to poor fmancial prac-
tices, however, the residents and officials of such units often were unwilling
to pay their debt service charges. This unwillingness to pay was particularly
noticeable in the case of debt-financed projects for essentially private pur-
poses. As long as the bank, canal, railroad, real estate development or other
project was successful there was no problem. If the project became unsuccess-
ful, however, the state and local unit was usually either unable or unwilling to
pay the debt service charges. Population characteristics, tax collection re-
cords, past debt payment performances, maturity schedules and voter ap-
proval for debt issues also have been found to indicate the willingness of state
and local units to pay their debt service charges.
Analysis of Cross Sections of Available
Instrument and Borrower Characteristics
In both major default periods and individual default situations in less extreme
periods, debt service charges rose more rapidly than the local levels of income
and wealth. The default usually did not occur until after the cash inflows of
the unit fell. In individual default situations the local decline in cash inflows
may have been caused by the failure of debt-financed private or local enter-
prises, the collapse of a local real estate boom or the decline of an industry or
company on which the community was heavily dependent.
Analysis of cross-sectional data for the 1929 period substantiates the im-
portance of the relationship between debt outstanding, a surrogate for debt
service charges, and selected wealth measures indicating potential revenues.
Table 8 shows population growth from 1922 tO1932was more rapid for the
eight states where defaulting governmental units numbered 200 or more and
the default situation was a serious statewide problem. This growth in popula-
tion apparently led to even greater demands for debt-financed services. For
the eight states with very serious default problems, per capita net debt in-
creased from $89.94 in 1922 to $170.99 in 1932, an increase of 90.1 per
cent. For all forty-eight states per capita net debt increased 77.3 per cent,
although for the eight states with no default situations in 1935 per capita net
debt increased only 51.7 per cent. Net debt per $1,000 of assessed value
increased much more rapidly from 1922 to 1932 for the eight states with the
most serious debt problems than for the average of all states. By 1932 the net
debt per $1,000 of assessed value for the eight states with serious default
problems was more than twice the size of this figure for eight states with no
defaults in 1935.
The default record of the 190 cities with populations of over 50,000 in
1930 illustrates the effect of the growth in debt relative to population in
individual cities. None of the nineteen cities with indebtedness of less than44 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
$50 per capita in 1935 had any serious difficulty in meeting debt require-
ments. All of the nineteen cities with debts of over $200 per capita in 1935
had financial problems. Eight of these nineteen cities were in default during
the depression; five were forced to engage in extensive refinancing operations
to avoid default; three others met their maturing obligations partially by the
issuance of refunding bonds; and the remaining three cities felt the pinch of
TABLE 8
Changes in Per Capita Net Debt and in Net Debt Per Thousand Dollars




bt Per $1,000 of
ssed Valuation
Per Cent Per Cent




Florida 357.74 95.96252.0 985.73233.17322.7
Louisana 169.05 69.18144.4 216.32 81.30166.1
Michigan 157.66 94.0967.6 94.68 61.01 55.2
New Jersey 278.61 116.40139.4 168.81 93.16 81.2
North Carolina 164.84 69.03138.8 188.21 72.48159.7
Ohio 129.89 112.25 15.7 64.38 64.33 .1
Texas 125.93 73.71 70.8 176.44105.36 67.5
Weighted Average170.99 89.9490.1 136.09 78.50 73.4
States with no
defaults in 1935
Connecticut $ 98.59$ 70.33 40.2,$ 51.00$ 51.43 d
Delaware 121.20 98.32 23.3 99.56 98.86 .7
Maryland 158.28 81.43 94.4 94.57 71.76 31.8
Massachusetts 101.77 82.3023.7 58.66 57.59 1.9
New Hampshire 67.81 36.16 87.5 46.70 26,09 79.0
Rhode Island 158.55 79.38 99.7 76.26 47.04 62.1
Vermont 75.50 34.03121.9 61.64 39.03 57.9
West Virginia 86.33 46.58 85.3 80.72 33.69139.6
Weighted Average108.96 71.83 51.7 66.79 53.03 26.0
For all 48 states 141.17 79.90 77.3 107.63 69.71 54.4
Sources:Bureau of the Census, Financial Statistics of State and Local Governments,
1932 and Public Debt, Washington, D.C., 1932 and 1924 respectively.
d =slightpercentage declineIdentification of Quality Characteristics 45
deferred commercial bills and payless paydays in order to meet their debt
requirements on time•17
The ratio of over-all net debt to estimated full taxable property valuation
appeared to be a significant indicator of defaults. Forty-nine of the 190 cities
with population over 50,000 had a ratio of 9.9 per cent or over in 1935. Only
two of these forty-nine cities were free of default, refunding of maturing
bonds or funding of deficits during the 1927-37 depression period. Fourteen
of these cities defaulted on their general obligation bonds and two had delays
classed as technical defaults. Five more defaulted on limited obligation special
assessment debt. Seven refunded maturing bonds and issued refunding bonds
to take up deficits or finance relief expenditures, seven more refunded matur-
ing bonds (including at least one forced refunding by exchange), and another
twelve issued funding bonds for deficit or relief financing or both. Nine of the
cities had over-all net debts of 15 per cent or more of full taxable property
value. Seven of these nine cities defaulted on their bonds, the eighth refunded
maturing bonds and funded deficits and the ninth funded relief expenses. The
forty-nine cities with over-all net-debt-to-taxable-property ratio of 9.9 per
cent or more accounted for two-thirds of the bond defaults in the 190 city
group, and they accounted for all of the situations with protracted difficul-
ties.18
The author used three multivariable statistical techniques —factoranaly-
sis, multiple discriminate analysis and multiple regression —toanalyze the
quantitative characteristics associated with the payment or nonpayment of
debt service charges by twenty-four Michigan cities in the early 1930's.19 The
quantitative characteristics available for this sample were: dollar amount of
notes outstanding, population, total assessed property values, dollar amount
of taxes levied, tax levy for $1,000 of assessed value, dollar amount of debt
outstanding, pôr capita debt, debt to assessed property values, per cent of
current taxes delinquent, tax levy per capita and assessed property values per
capita. The population figures were from 1930 census, the assessed values
were for the 1932-33 fiscal year and the remaining measures were as of July
1933.
The factor analysis identified four potential groupings of the eleven quan-
titative characteristics: (1) size characteristics; (2) debt burden measures, debt
'7Freclerick L. Bird, "Cities and Their Debt Burden," National Municipal Review,
XXV, No. 1 (January l936),pp. 12-19.
'8The figures are basedon unpublished information obtained from Dun and Brad-
street.
'9The author was unable to obtain adequate quantitative information fora larger or
broader sample of state and local units in this period. The gathering of the information
on the twenty-four Michigan cities and the ensuing statistical analysis were financed by a
grant from the Reim Foundation of Ann Arbor, Michigan.46 Postwar Quality of State and Local Debt
to assessed valuation and debt to population; (3) relative wealth and tax
measures, and (4) measures of willingness to pay, such as the tax delinquency
rate and the relative tax levy. Because of complications in iaterpreting the
results of factor analysis, these results were primarily used to select the most
meaningful combinations of variables for use in further multivariate analysis.
Several different high and low default classes were used with multiple
discriminate analysis. The discriminate function between the seven cities with
no defaults on their indebtedness in the 1929-37 period and the seventeen
cities with one or more issues in default during the same period seemed most
meaningful on conceptual grounds and provided the most meaningful results.
The most impressive discriminate analysis results occurred when four charac-
teristics —taxrate per $1,000 assessed valuation, tax delinquency rate, assess-
ed property value per capita and either debt to assessed property values or per
capita debt —wereused. None of the characteristics was almost a linear
combination of the other characteristics, three of the four characteristics
were significant at the p> .10 level (using the ttest)and the probability that
the discriminate function was due to chance was a relatively low 4 per cent.
The confusion matrix (assuming equal a priori probabilities and equal costs)
indicated that there were three misclassifications between the defaulting and
nondefaulting groups.
The highest proportion of total debt outstanding that was in default in the
1929-37 period was used as the dependent variable in the multiple regression
analysis. Using only the variables that were significant at the p > .075 level,
the linear regression equation explained approximately 64 per cent of the
observed differences in the municipalities' default ratios. Using several combi-
nations of only four variables (to restrict multicollinearity), the coefficients
of the independent variables were consistent with the conceptual model and
the resulting equations explained 40-50 per cent of the observed differences
in the default ratios. The characteristics (independent variables) that were
used in the preceding regression equations included the five variables which
were particularly meaningful in the discriminate analysis and the tax levy per
capita.
When multicollinearity is restricted, the variables in both the discriminate
analysis and the multiple regression seem consistent with the conceptual mod-
el formulated in Chapter 2 of this study. Debt to assessed property values (or
per capita debt) would seem to be a meaningful proxy for the relationship
between debt service charges and the revenues available to meet these charges.
Assessed property values per capita and the property tax levy per $1,000 of
assessed property value should indicate the relative wealth of the unit and the
extent to which the municipal government is tapping this wealth. These char-
acteristics should improve the quality of the debt to assessed property valueIdentification of Quality Characteristics 47
or population ratio. The tax delinquency rate and the tax levy per capita
would seem to enter into the conceptual model as tests of the financial
prudence and willingness to pay of the municipal government and its constit-
uents.
Sum ma?y
Both aggregate time series data and cross-sectional analysis of historical
instrument and borrower characteristics support the conceptual model devel-
oped in Chapter 2. The amount of debt outstanding, a surrogate for debt
service charges increased rapidly before each of-the four major default periods
and prior to many individual default situations. Wealth and income measures,
which are indicative of potential cash inflows, appear to have risen less rapid-
ly than estimated debt service charges prior to default periods and situations.
These measures then declined absolutely in the economic decline immediately
preceding each of the four major default periods. Cash outlays to be paid
prior to debt service charges failed to decline as rapidly as cash inflows.
Finally, the use of state and local debt for essentially private purposes and a
continuing deficit in the current account preceded both major default periods
and many individual default situations.